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Part I. General overview of consumer credit secured on immovables 
The Republic of Ireland has been distinguished internationally by high rates of 
homeownership and to a lesser extent by low rates of private renting and social 
renting.
1
 The high rates of homeownership which characterised the Irish housing 
sector during much of the latter half of the twentieth century derived substantial 
momentum from extensive State support. This was expressed through various direct 
and indirect subsidies, taxation schemes and the operation of mass tenant purchase 
schemes.
2
 The role of the private rented and social rented sectors, while recognised as 
being of value, were nonetheless clearly subservient to owner occupation as a form of 
tenure for much of the 20
th
 century.
3
 Homeownership rates peaked during the late 
1980s/early 1990s at roughly 80% of all households, however since then rates of 
homeownership have fallen due largely to a resurgence in private renting. In 2011, 
almost seventy percent of Irish households were owner occupiers while about twenty 
percent rented from a private landlord and about eight percent were social renters. 
The number of Irish households owning their dwelling with the aid of a mortgage has 
increased consistently. In 1971 just a fifth of Irish households had residential 
mortgages, however by 2011 just over fifty per cent of owner occupiers held their 
property with the aid of a mortgage or loan.
4
  
During the 1990s a housing bubble developed in Ireland with property prices and rates 
of housing construction increasing rapidly. Between 1997 and 2007 residential and 
commercial property prices increased almost four-fold.
5
 This was made possible by a 
dramatic extension in the availability of credit.
6
 However, in 2007 the housing bubble 
burst leading to rapid falls in property prices, rates of construction and mortgage 
                                                          
1
 Central Statistics Office, Census 2011: Profile 4 The Roof over our Heads - Housing in Ireland (Dublin: 
Stationery Office, 2011), p. 12. 
2
 P. Kenna, ‘Housing Law, Rights and Policy’ (Clarus Press 2011); chapter 2. T. Fahey & B. Maitre, ‘Home 
Ownership and Social Inequality in Ireland’, in K. Kurz & H. Blossfeld (eds.), Homeownership and Social 
Inequality in Comparative Perspective (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p.284. It has been 
estimated that the result of such sales was the addition of roughly twenty five per cent to the owner 
occupier rate. 
3
 P. Kenna, ‘Housing Law, Rights and Policy’ (Clarus Press 2011); chapter 2. Also see N. Maddox, 
Mortgages, Law and Practice (Dublin, Round Hall, 2007); J. Wylie, Irish Land Law 4th edn (Bloomsbury, 
2010).  
4
 P. Kenna, ‘Housing Law, Rights and Policy’ (Clarus Press 2011); 7-07; See Central Statistics Office, 
Census 2011: Profile 4 The Roof over our Heads - Housing in Ireland (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2011), p. 
12. 
5
 Central Bank of Ireland, Address by Deputy Governor Stefan Gerlach at the Berlin Finance Lecture, 
Berlin, 14 January 2013, Ireland: From Crisis to Recovery (Dublin, Stationery office, 2013), p. 3. 
6
 P. Honohan, The Irish Banking Crisis – Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 2003-2008, - A Report to 
the Minister for Finance by the Government of the Central Bank, (Central Bank, 2010).  
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lending. According to the Irish Banking Federation (now the Banking and Payment 
Federation of Ireland) mortgage lending in Ireland fell from a peak of in excess of 
200,000 residential loans in 2008 to less than 15,000 in 2011.
7
 The balance sheets of 
Irish banks declined, access to international finance markets effectively came to an end 
and Bank share prices fell dramatically. In 2008 the Government guaranteed Irish bank 
liabilities. This overreached the public finances and ultimately led to a bailout of the 
State by the Troika. The ensuing ﬁnancial, social and economic crises were severe. 
With the onset of the recession the number of households falling into arrears or calling 
upon the State social welfare support scheme for indebted homeowners, i.e. mortgage 
interest supplement, increased dramatically,
8
 as did applications for social housing 
support. Between 2005 and 2011, the number of households assessed as being in need 
of housing doubled to almost 100,000 households. This increase was largely due to a 
dramatic rise in the number of households unable to meet the cost of their 
accommodation, two thirds of those needing housing in 2011 for reasons of 
affordability.
9
 
At the end of 2013 Ireland exited the bailout program and since then the Irish 
economy began to grow once again. Indeed, house prices began to increase rapidly – 
rising in Dublin by about 50% from trough in 2010.
10
 In spite of popular opposition, the 
Central Bank of Ireland have introduced a range of macro prudential measures in 2015 
aimed at restricting risky lending and dampening property price speculation. Limits 
have been set on loan to value and loan to income ratios.
11
 In spite of the turnaround 
of the economy, there remain considerable difficulties in the mortgage market. In 
particular, long term arrears remain at extremely high levels. This has led to a range of 
policy measures including the development of a mortgage to rent scheme as well as 
broader reform of regulation of lenders. It is in the context that the Mortgage Credit 
Directive has been introduced.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 ‘Mortgage Market Profile - Data Series 2005-2012’ (Dublin: IBF/PwC, 2012). Data for 2013 was taken 
from ‘IBF PwC Mortgage Market Profile Q4 2013’’ (Dublin: IBF/PwC, 2014), p. 2. 
8
 Department of Social Protection, Annual SWS Statistical Information Report 2012 (Dublin: Stationery 
Office, 2012), Section G. 
9
 Department of the Environment, Housing Needs Assessment 2011 (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2011), p. 
1. 
10
 S. Gerlach, The Return of Ireland’s housing bubble (2016).  
11
 S. Gerlach, The Central Bank of Ireland’s macro prudential policy (Oct, 2015). 
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Credits and securities in the Irish mortgage market  
Table 1: Snapshot of the Irish mortgage market 2016 
 % of total market lending 
in the first six months of 
2016
12
 
Standard variable rate 
(SVR)* 
Allied Irish Bank 34 3.40% 
Bank of Ireland  29 4.24% 
Ulster Bank 19 4.00%. 
KPC 12 4.25% 
Permanent TSB  9 4.50% 
*Applying to existing customers at August 2016. 
 
Credits and securities available on the Irish mortgage market 
There are a wide variety of credits and securities available in the Irish mortgage 
market. The number and variety of mortgage products increased considerably during 
the housing bubble. At peak in 2007, the range of mortgage products included a 
number of fixed rate mortgage products differentiated by the duration of the fixed 
term i.e. 1-3 years, 3-5 years and 5 years or more, and a range of variable rate 
mortgage products. Broadly speaking there are two types of variable rate loans – those 
that track the ECB base rate at an agreed margin (trackers) and those that do not.
13
 
While there are various versions of non-tracker mortgages, in general, lenders who 
offer non-tracker mortgages offer no specific link to an underlying market or wholesale 
rate and can choose to increase or decrease the rate at its discretion.
14
   
                                                          
12
 Irish Times (12 August 2016). Available at http://www.irishtimes.com/business/financial-
services/ulster-bank-gets-larger-share-of-irish-mortgage-market-1.2753985?mode=sample&auth-
failed=1&pw-origin=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Ffinancial-services%2Fulster-
bank-gets-larger-share-of-irish-mortgage-market-1.2753985 (last accessed 29 August 2016). 
13
 J. Goggin, The financial crisis and the pricing of interest rates in the Irish mortgage market: 2003-2011 
(Central Bank, Research Technical Paper 1/RT/12, 2012), p. 4. 
14
 J. Goggin, The financial crisis and the pricing of interest rates in the Irish mortgage market: 2003-2011 
(Central Bank, Research Technical Paper 1/RT/12, 2012), p. 4. 
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The main variable rate mortgage products included standard variable mortgages, 
tracker mortgages as well as current saver account, discount and 3-in-1 mortgages.
15
 In 
recent years variable rate mortgages have proved highly popular in Ireland. From 1999 
to 2007, the share of variable rate loans in Irish mortgages increased considerably 
rising from about half of outstanding mortgages to over three quarters of mortgages 
by end 2007.
16
 The majority of these are tracker mortgages (60%) which has allowed 
consumers to avail of unprecedentedly low ECB interest rates.
17
 However, with the 
onset of the financial crisis interest only and tracker mortgages were effectively 
withdrawn.
18
 Nevertheless there remain a considerable variety of mortgage products 
including annuity mortgages, interest only mortgages, deferred start mortgages, offset 
mortgages and cash back mortgages.  
A recent innovation in the Irish mortgage market is the ‘cash back’ mortgage. Under 
this mortgage the creditor gives a one-off lump sum payment, in some case 2% of the 
value of the mortgage, to new borrowers at the beginning of a mortgage. This is often 
marketed as ‘free cash’ however the sum is actually funded by mortgage interest 
payments. These loans are heavily marketed towards first time buyers who may have a 
cash shortfall immediately after taking out the mortgage and so may struggle to afford 
to furnish the dwelling. Initially banks sought to attach a ‘claw back’ condition such 
that in the event that the borrower pays of the mortgage or switches the mortgage 
within 5 years of drawdown the bank could reclaim the fee. However, in light of the 
introduction of the MCD, banks dropped the condition in favour of a loyalty payment 
after five years. Cash bank mortgages tend to require as a condition that the borrower 
has a current account with the bank.
19
 
With respect to annuity or repayment mortgages, which are the most common 
mortgage, monthly repayments contribute to the capital and interest payment on the 
loan. The interest rate may be fixed for a period, usually one to three years although 
longer periods are possible, or it may be variable or indeed it may combine the 
characteristics of both fixed and variable i.e. a split mortgage.  
There are a number of variable rates in the Irish mortgage market including a standard 
variable rate pinned to the European Central Bank rate. In addition, there are also 
loan-to-value rates, which depends on the size of the mortgage compared to the value 
of the home and tracker mortgages, which are set as a fixed percentage above the ECB 
                                                          
15
 N. Doyle, “Housing Finance Development in Ireland”, Central Bank Quarterly Bulletin, October 2009, 
p.81.  
16
 Doyle 2009: p. 48. 
17
 P. Kenna, ‘Housing Law, Rights and Policy’ (Clarus Press 2011), para. 7-13. 
18
 P. Kenna, ‘Housing Law, Rights and Policy’ (Clarus Press 2011), para. 7-12. 
19
 http://www.independent.ie/business/personal-finance/latest-news/bank-of-ireland-to-pay-
customers-4500-to-take-out-150000-mortgage-35003874.html  (last accessed August 2016). 
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rate. Discounted rates which allow a temporary rate that lowers repayments over an 
initial period (e.g. 1 year) after which the borrower has the option to go onto a fixed or 
variable rate are also available, as are capped rates which but cannot go beyond an 
upper limit. Under a split rate mortgage, part of the mortgage is on a fixed rate while 
the remainder is on a variable rate.  
There continue to be a considerable number of interest only mortgages in Ireland.
20
 
These come in two main forms – pension mortgages and endowment mortgages.
21
 
Some basic features are common to both. In particular, the borrower’s monthly 
repayments only go towards paying the interest payment on the loan. It is at the end 
of the term that the capital amount of the loan falls due. How this is repaid depends 
on the form of the interest only mortgage at issue. For instance, where a pension 
policy or endowment policy is taken out then the alongside the monthly interest 
payment, the borrower will also pay into one of these policies. At the end of the term, 
the policy is cashed out and the proceeds are used to discharge the capital amount 
borrowed. There is greater risk for the borrower in such mortgages as the end of the 
term there may be a shortfall between the proceeds of sale of the policy and the 
capital value of the loan outstanding. In this case the borrower will be responsible for 
meeting any shortfall. A variant on the interest only mortgage may require the 
property to be sold at the end of the term to cover the costs of the original loan. Given 
the greater risk involved, interest only mortgages tended to be more difficult to access 
and were generally out of the reach of first time buyers.  
There are also a number of other mortgage products including deferred start 
mortgages, repayment holidays and offset mortgages. Under deferred start mortgages 
the repayments on the mortgage do not start for a number of months. The lender will 
charge interest on the mortgage for these months and add it to the original loan. With 
repayment holiday mortgages the repayment schedule is spread out over 10 or 11 
months instead of the usual 12. Thus there will be one or two months a year where the 
borrower will not make a repayment. However, repayments will be higher to cover the 
cost of these ‘holiday’ monhts.  
Finally, offset mortgages or current account mortgages have been used in the Irish 
mortgage market. Under this mortgage, a variable interest rate is combined with a 
current account. The borrower pays their salary into the current account which is 
accessable throughout in the usual way i.e. to deposit, withdraw money. If the 
borrower wishes to pay ahead of schedule, he may pay in extra amounts if he wishes. 
                                                          
20
 J. Kelly, “Interest only mortgages in Ireland” (Central Bank, 2014).  
21
 Clams of negligence misrepresentation by banks in the selling of endowment mortgages, where policy 
holders suffered loss. Cases taken in 2010 were not statute barred where the policy holders became 
aware of the losses in the previous six years (Kenna 2011: 7-14). 
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Where the account is in credit, the borrower will be charged mortgage interest on the 
difference between the balance on the mortgage and the balance in the current 
accout. Thus the balance in the current account can reduces the amount of interest 
due.
22
 
Equity release schemes  
Equity release schemes operate in the Irish mortgage market and come in two forms – 
home reversion schemes and equity release schemes. A home reversion involves a sale 
of part of the value of the property and leads to a co-ownership arrangement rather 
than a mortgage type transaction. By contrast under an equity release schemes the 
borrower, usually an elderly person, takes out a mortgage over their home or part of 
the value of the dwelling to release some equity from their home. The loan is not 
repaid until the borrower permanently moves out or dies, so it grows over time as 
interest is added to the balance. These ‘lifetime loans’ may be fixed rate or variable 
rate in the usual way. There were a number of schemes in Ireland including the Bank of 
Ireland “Life Loan” Mortgage, the S.H.I.P ‘Seniors Finance” Mortgage Scheme, and the 
Seniors Money 60plus Loan however while such loans remain legal, the Central Bank 
states that none are being provided at present. Any new loans would be caught by the 
Central Bank’s Consumer Protection Code 20012 now applies to any new loans.
 23
 
Although these schemes have been withdrawn there are about 3,100 customers owing 
approx. €320m under life loan products.
24
 
Serious concerns about the operation of such schemes have been expressed by the 
Law Society of Ireland as well as others.
25
 In particular, the Law Society have drawn 
attention to a number of industry practices including the requirement as a condition of 
the loan that the borrower make a will and disclose the name of the executor, any 
beficiairies, etc, raising questons over the potential for intrustion into the privacy 
rights of the borrowers. Furthermore, in some mortgages the bank reserves the right 
to call for repayment of the loan or to sell the house during the borrowers lifetime if 
another bank forecloses on a different property of the borrower which is in no way 
connected with the life loan mortgage or if an undertakings given by solicitor has not 
been complied with (even if not relation to security). The Law Society have also drawn 
attention to the penalisation of borrowers by way of redemption fee for early 
                                                          
22
 Above derived from http://www.consumerhelp.ie/types-of-mortgages (last accessed 26 August 2016). 
23
 https://www.fiannafail.ie/life-loan-customers-need-to-be-vigilant-as-liability-grows-dramatically-
mcgrath/  (last accessed 26 August 2016) 
24
 https://www.fiannafail.ie/life-loan-customers-need-to-be-vigilant-as-liability-grows-dramatically-
mcgrath/ (last accessed 26 August 2016). 
25
 Proposed regulation of home revirsion and lifetime mortgages (Law Society of Ireland, 2007). 
Available at 
https://www.lawsociety.ie/documents/committees/conveyancing/submissions/Equity%20Release%20FI
NAL%20Submission.pdf 
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repayment. Such conditions while set out in accordance with the CCA 1995, may 
nonetheless be excessive and expressed in intellible language.
26
 
Foreign consumers buying/investing in residential immoveable property 
There is a limited amount of research on this issue in Ireland.
27
 Prior to the 
establishment of a new property transactions database in 2010, there were no robust 
national data on housing transactions in the Irish market. Unfortunately, this new 
register does not record the nationality of the purchaser. However, rates of 
immigration suggest that a wide range of international households make their home in 
Ireland. In particular, a considerable number of EU citizens, most notable British and to 
a lesser extent eastern Europeans, make their home in Ireland. Census data reveals 
that tenure varies considerably according to nationality. For instance, there are about 
32,000 UK nationals resident in the State who own their own home – half of whom 
own with the aid of a mortgage. This equates to about 60% of all UK households living 
in Ireland.
28
 By contrast 2000 Polish households were homeowners, this equated to 
just under 5% of all Polish households living in Ireland.
29
 However, unlike UK nationals, 
the vast majority of Polish households own their home with the aid of a mortgage. For 
the rest of the EU, there were roughly 6,000 home owning households from EU 15 
(excluding Ireland and the UK), which corresponds to roughly a third of all EU 15 
households living in Ireland. With respect to EU15 to EU27 (excluding Poland) 
households. In this case about 3000 households were homeowners, representing 
about 8% of total EU 15-EU27 households living in Ireland.
30
 
Default and arrears 
The ﬁnancial, economic and ensuing mortgage arrears crises in Ireland have been 
among the most severe in the OECD. The Irish experience has also been particularly 
unusual in that, due to legal and political uncertainty, home foreclosures were rare by 
international standards.
31
 This has led to an unprecedented increase in mortgages 
arrears, particularly long term arrears (over one year in arrears).
32
 By March 2016, 
some 8% of residential mortgage accounts were in arrears of more than ninety days.
33
 
                                                          
26
 Proposed regulation of home revirsion and lifetime mortgages (Law Society of Ireland, 2007).  
27
 P. Sparkes, Cross Border Acquisition of Residential Property in the EU: Problems Encountered by 
Citizens (European Parliament, 2016).  
28
 Census 2011 profile 4: Roof over our heads (CSO, 2012), p. 19.  
29
 Census 2011 profile 4: Roof over our heads (CSO, 2012), pp 60-61 
30
 Census 2011 profile 4: Roof over our heads (CSO, 2012), pp 60-61. 
31
 R. Kelly & F. McCann, (2015) Some defaults are deeper than others: understanding long-term 
mortgage arrears, research technical paper, 5/RT/15, p. 3.  
32
 R. Kelly & F. McCann, (2015) Some defaults are deeper than others: understanding long-term 
mortgage arrears, research technical paper, 5/RT/15, p. 3.  
33
 Section 3(a) of the Code of Conduct on Mortgage Arrears states “a mortgage arrears problem arises as 
soon as the borrower fails to make a mortgage repayment by the due date”. 
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This number has fallen consistently in recent years – from a high water mark of 13% in 
2013 – with the latest figures marking the tenth consecutive decline in arrears over 90 
days. While the number of short term arrears has reduced consistently, long term 
arrears have remained stubbornly high. In 2016, accounts in arrears over 720 days 
constituted over 40 per cent of all accounts in arrears and 86 per cent of arrears 
outstanding. 
34
 It is no surprise to find that since the economic crisis, beginning in 
2007, the group most likely to be in greatest debt are first time buyers who bought at 
the top of the market (2005-2007) and particularly first time buyers living in Dublin.
35
 
Many first time buyers in Dublin took on 100% mortgages so that the subsequent 
collapse of house prices led to negative equity, with increased risk of default.  
While there has been a sharp increase in the mortgage arrears this was not 
accompanied by a comparable increase in repossessions. Instead, many non-
performing mortgages have been restructured by private agreement between lender 
and borrower.
36
 By the end of March 2016 roughly 120,000 private dwelling houses 
mortgages had been restructured – the vast majority (over 90%) of which have been 
successful.
37
 Restructuring has taken a variety of different forms. About a third of 
arrangments involved arrears capitalisation, where some or all of the arrears are 
added to the remaining principal balance to be repaid over the term of the mortgage. 
A fifth of restructure arrangements were split mortgages, a sixth involved term 
extension while the remainder comprised a variety of temporary interest rate 
reductions (6%), deferred interest and interest only (4%), reduced payment (8.5%), 
payment moratorium (1%) as well as a range of others (15%).
38
 
The absence of a sharp increase in repossession is due to combination of legal and 
policy measures. In the first place the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 
played a significant role in reducing the amount of repossessions in Ireland. By 
inadvertently repealing certain legislation the Act made it more difficult for a lender to 
secure a court order for possession.
39
 In addition to this measure a one year 
moratorium on possession on primary residences was introduced in 2010. The 
                                                          
34
 Mortgage Arrears and Repossessions Statistics: Q1 2016, p 1. 
35
 In 2006, 74% of this group borrowed over €250,000 compared to 38%of first time buyers in the 
country as a whole, and 64% of repeat homebuyers and property investors in Dublin: Norris and 
Winston, ‘'Transforming Irish Home Ownership’ International Journal of Housing Policy, 11(1) (2011): p. 
13. 
36
 Mortgage Arrears and Repossessions Statistics: Q1 2016, p 3. 
37
 Mortgage Arrears and Repossessions Statistics: Q1 2016, p 3. 
38
 Mortgage Arrears and Repossessions Statistics: Q1 2016, p 4-5. 
39
 The Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 (LCLRA) repealed or amended provisions of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881 and the Registration of Title Act 1964. The lacuna was originally identified in 
Start Mortgages Ltd & Ors v Gunn & Ors [2011] IEHC 275. 
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introduction of the Code of Conduct on Mortgage Arrears further encumbering the 
ability of the lender to take possession.
40
  
The lacuna in Irish law which benefited struggling householders was closed by the Land 
and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2013
41
 and revisions to the Code of Conduct on 
Mortgage Arrears in July 2013, by which the law on repossession was returned to the 
pre-2009 reform. These changes have led to an increase in legal proceedings and 
repossessions. In the first nine months of 2015 over 1,100 possession orders were 
made by the Irish courts representing an increase of almost 70% on the same period in 
2014. When set against the same period in 2013, the increase is a remarkable 350%.
42
  
The increased rate of repossession has raised the threat of homelessness for many 
households in arrears.
43
 This has prompted a number of proposals including extending 
financial supports for households in arrears, expanding the mortgage to rent scheme, 
increasing protection of households which are co-operating with their lender and 
extending the availability of Personal Insolvency Arrangement schemes.
44
 Under the 
mortgage to rent scheme, the borrower surrenders possession to the mortgage lender 
who immediately sells it to a housing association. The housing association then rents it 
to the borrower. The scheme is only available to borrowers under a certain income 
threshold and only to those borrowers who are engaging with the lender under the 
Mortgage Arrears Resolution Protocol. The borrower may have the option to buy back 
their home after a period of 5 years if their situation improves.  
Why did the legal system regarding securities over immovables fail consumers? 
The mortgage market was at the centre of the financial and economic crisis which 
engulfed Ireland following the collapse of the housing bubble in 2007. The bubble was 
made possible by a dramatic expansion in credit available in the Irish mortgage market. 
This expansion was the product of a number of factors including deregulation of the 
Irish credit market since the mid-1980s,
45
 the innovation of mortgage products and the 
development of cross border lending.
46
 The subsequent collapse of the Irish mortgage 
market has been attributed to a wide range of factors including Government fiscal and 
                                                          
40
 See R. Waldron & D. Redmond, ‘The Extent of the Mortgage Crisis in Ireland and Policy Responses’ 
29(1) (2014): 149-165. 
41
 Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2013. 
42
 Mortgage Arrears and Repossessions Statistics: Q1 2016, p 5-6. 
43
 Housing and Homelessness Committee (2016), p. 70. 
44
 Housing and Homelessness Committee (2016), p. 76. Some of these have been incorporated in the 
Programme for Government (2016) 
 
45
 J. Kelly & M. Everett, Financial Liberalisation and Economic Growth in Ireland (Central Bank, 2013), p. 
94-97. 
46
 Y. McCarthy & K. McQuinn, Credit conditions in a boom and bust property market (Central Bank, 
2013), p. 4. 
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housing policy in the years preceding the crash, the complicity of directors and senior 
bank managers in the development of irresponsible lending practices and, crucially, 
the ineffective regulatory oversight of those lending institutions.
47
 
In the years leading up the crisis there was an acute Government fiscal and housing 
policy focus on addressing perceived supply side constraints within the Irish housing 
market during the 1990s and 2000s.
48
 This was in spite of the fact that the house 
market was already recording record levels of house price growth and housing 
construction since the 1990s.
49
 Adopting pro-cyclical policies contributed to the 
already rapid expansion in the housing market.
50
  
Irresponsible lending practices also played a major role in the development of the 
housing bubble.
51
 These included various lending practices such as lending at high 
multiples of income and sub-prime lending.
52
 In 1995 the average first-time buyer took 
out a mortgage equal to three years’ average industrial earnings, and the average 
house cost four years’ earnings. By the bubble peak in late 2006, the average first-time 
buyer mortgage had risen to eight times average earnings, and the average new house 
cost ten times average earnings but the multiple was seventeen in Dublin.
53
 Mortgage 
lending at high multiples of income was one of the main causes of increases in 
property prices during the early 2000s and was a significant reason for the sharp 
contraction in the downturn.
54
 Studies commissioned by the Central Bank have shown 
a positive relationship between higher loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios and 
                                                          
47
 P. Honohan, The Irish Banking Crisis – Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 2003-2008, - A Report 
to the Minister for Finance by the Government of the Central Bank, (Central Bank, 2010). 
48
 Bacon & Assoc., An Economic Assessment of Recent House Price Developments (Dublin: Stationery 
Office, 1998), Bacon and Assocs, The Housing Market: An Economic Review and Assessment (Dublin: 
Stationery  Office, 1999), Bacon & Assocs, Medium Term Projections of the Supply and Demand for 
Apartments in Dublin City Centre (Wexford: Peter Bacon & Assocs, 2003), P. Bacon & F. McCabe, The 
Housing Market in Ireland: An Economic Evaluation of Trends and Prospects (Dublin: Stationery  Office, 
2000).  
49
 Between 1995 and 2007 real Irish house prices grew by more than any other country within the OECD. 
49
 See Y. McCarthy & K. McQuinn, Credit conditions in a boom and bust property market (Central Bank, 
2013), p.1.  
50
 P. Honohan, The Irish Banking Crisis – Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 2003-2008, - A Report 
to the Minister for Finance by the Government of the Central Bank, (Central Bank, 2010); Chapter 2.  
51
 S. Gerlach, ‘The Central Bank of Ireland’s macro prudential policy’ (Oct, 2015). 
52
 See P. Kenna, Housing Law Rights and Policy (Clarus, 2011), 7.90. 
53
 M. Kelly The Irish Credit Bubble (Dublin: University College Dublin, 2009), p. 2. Indeed, the number of 
mortgages of over 250,000 increased from 2.6% of total in 2000 to 41% of the total in 2007. 100% 
mortgages became available in 2004 and accounted for 4% of all mortgages granted in that year, while 
in 2008 such 100% mortgages accounted for 12% of all mortgages granted. A huge amount of financial 
product innovation took place among mainstream lenders during this period see M. Norris and N. 
Winston, ‘'Transforming Irish Home Ownership Through Credit Deregulation, Boom and Crunch'’., 
International Journal of Housing Policy, 11(1), (2011): 1-21. 
54
 Y. McCarthy & K. McQuinn, Credit conditions in a boom and bust property market (Central Bank, 
2013). 
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subsequent mortgage defaults.
55
 The assumption behind such lending was that house 
prices would continue to rise for the foreseeable future.  
These assumptions and the risky mortgage products which resulted went unchallenged 
by regulatory bodies. There was a major failure in terms of bank regulation and the 
maintenance of financial stability failure during the development of the housing 
bubble.
56
 This failure was apparent in three broad areas including the lack of 
supervision of individual institutions,
57
 ineffective approach to overall financial stability 
policy
58
 and the failure to undertake decisive and effective remedial measure to offset 
the crisis.
59
 During this period, the regulatory approach of the Central Bank and 
Financial Services Authority of Ireland was characterised by a deference towards 
lending institutions and a failure to take sufficient decisive action on the foot of clear 
and pointed warnings in the face of public opinion. The systemic failure of the 
regulatory system also revealed major gaps in the consumer protection framework. 
While there were some relatively advanced consumer protection measures in Ireland, 
for instance the Consumer Credit Act 1995 shares similar content to the MCD, the 
regulatory model in respect of mortgages was largely premised on codes of conduct 
which were of limited legal effect
60
 and lacked effective enforcement mechanisms.  
 
 
 
                                                          
55
 N. Hallissey, “Macro-prudential tools and credit risk of property lending of Irish Banks”, (Central Bank, 
2014); Y. McCarthy, (2014) “Disentangling the Mortgage Arrears Crisis: The Role of the Labour Market, 
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56
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60
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Part II. The Impact of Directive 2014/17 
Has your country transposed Directive 2014/17? If so, please state what provisions 
have been enacted and whether they are prudential, civil or penal provisions.  Please 
provide links to official versions, including English versions whenever possible.  
If applicable, do you think that, in general terms, the transposition has been carried 
out adequately? If not, please state the main reasons why. 
The Republic of Ireland has transposed Directive 2014/17 by means of a Ministerial 
Regulation the European Union (Consumer Mortgage Credit Agreements) Regulations 
2016, SI No 142 of 2016, which came into operation on 21 March 2016.
61
  Transposing 
the MCD by means of a Ministerial regulation, rather than an Act of the Oireachtas 
(Act of Parliament), limited the extent to which more stringent provisions could be 
adopted. However, transposition of EU directives by means of Ministerial Regulation is 
commonplace in Ireland
62
 for reasons of expediency.
63
 The transposition has largely 
been an exercise in copy and paste from the MCD, with a number of technical 
adjustments and the notable exception of ‘appointed representatives’ who do not 
appear in the Regulation. A number of discretions have also been adopted which are 
set out below. A creditor or mortgage credit intermediary who contravenes a provision 
of the transposing Regulation commits an offence punishable on summary conviction 
to fine and or imprisonment.
64
 The Central Bank of Ireland may also administer 
administrative sanctions for contravention of these provisions.
65
 Broadly speaking the 
transposition has been carried out adequately.  
Even if the Directive has not been transposed, we would like to find out what 
changes it entails in your legal system and whether they remedy any of the problems 
you have pointed out to be the most relevant in Part I. 
In particular, it would be good to address the following areas: 
1) If the Directive has been transposed, and with regard to its scope, has your 
country made use of the possibility to not apply the Directive or part thereof as per 
art. 3.3? If so, does allow for the continuation of bad practices?  
Buy to let mortgages 
                                                          
61
 SI No 142 of 2016. Made under the European Communities Act 1972 (as amended). The transposing 
regulation is available at http://www.finance.gov.ie/sites/default/files/SI1422016FIN.pdf (Last accessed 
26 August 2016). 
62
 Recently, the Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48/EC was transposed in the same way.  
63
 Regulatory Impact Analysis in relation to the transposition of the Mortgage Credit Directive 
(Department of Finance, 2016), p. 2-3. 
64
 SI No 142 of 2016, reg. 39.  
65
 SI No 142 of 2016, reg. 39(6). 
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Ireland did not exercise the discretion available under art. 3(3)(b) and accordingly the 
Regulations apply to ‘Buy to Let’ mortgages. However, it is only where the borrower 
comes within the definition of a ‘consumer’ that the ‘BTL’ mortgage be caught by the 
MCD. The task of determining whether or not a borrower is a ‘consumer’ falls to the 
lender. This may prove a tall order given the characteristics of the private rented 
sector in Ireland where the majority of landlords tend to be non-professional 
individuals holding a small number of properties.
66
 Nevertheless, in these conditions it 
is plain to see the risk for such landlords, their families and indeed their tenants. For 
instance, a ‘consumer type’ landlord may well cross securitise a BTL mortgage on his 
principal private residence. Thus in the event of a default, both the tenants home and 
the family home of the landlord will be at risk.  
Loans provided on better terms i.e. local authority loans   
Ireland did exercise the discretion available under art. 3(3)(c) and accordingly local 
authority mortgages will be exempt from the Regulations.
67
 Local authority mortgages 
are provided to a restricted public under a separate statutory framework (i.e. the 
Housing Acts 1966-2014) which falls under the remit of the Department of the 
Environment, Community and Local Government.
68
 Instead of bringing such mortgages 
within the scope of the Regulations, the Government have decided that such 
mortgages should continue to fall the current statutory regime. However, the 
Government have committed to ensuring that the current statutory regime will be 
updated to incorporate the consumer information and protection measures of the 
Directive and to provide that the consumers of local authority mortgage finance will 
receive timely information on the main features, risks and costs of such credit 
agreements at the pre-contractual stage, and that the advertising of such credit 
agreements is fair, clear and not misleading. 
Given that local authority loans are governed by the Consumer Credit Act 1995 in 
much the same way as other ‘housing loans’, it is not clear on what basis the decision 
was made to exclude local authority loans from the remit of the Directive.
69
 Local 
authorities are a major source of mortgage finance in Ireland.
70
 At present there are 
about 18,000 local authority mortgage issued to over 28,000 named borrowers
71
 with 
                                                          
66
 See Tenlaw Report on the Republic of Ireland (ZERP, 2014).  
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 SI No 142 of 2016, reg. 5(2)(g).  
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a total value of over €1 billion.
72
 The majority of these mortgages (about 14,000) are 
charged at a variable mortgage interest rate while the remainder have interest rates 
that are fixed or are set in accordance with a tailored loan scheme specific to local 
authority housing. The main house purchase loan currently available from local 
authorities is the standard annuity mortgage, targeted at lower income first time 
buyers. Given that approximately one third of all mortgages are in arrears of over 90 
days, with many considerably longer in arrears, it is clear that these loans carry 
significant risk for the borrower and it is clear to see the potential benefit of extending 
the provisions of the MCD to this group of consumers.
73
  
Bridging loans  
Ireland did not exercise the discretion under art. 3(2)(d) and accordingly these 
Regulations will apply to relevant bridging loans.  
Loans provided by credit unions or friendly societies  
Ireland did not exercise the discretion available under art. 3(3)(3) and accordingly the 
Regulations apply to credit agreements entered into by Credit Unions and Friendly 
Societies. This was a notable departure from pre-existing approach to regulation of this 
sector of the credit market. For instance, the Consumer Protection Code doesn’t apply 
to credit unions nor such lenders fall within the scope of the Consumer Credit Act 1995 
until an amendment was passed in 2010.
74
 The Regulatory Impact Assessment justifies 
the change in practice by setting out that it will provide for a more level regulatory 
playing field in relation to mortgage loans.
75
 As noted by FLAC during the consultation 
on the transposition of the MCD, while some credit unions may have departed from 
the traditional small social lending role, many have not and these may well be put 
under pressure by this general change.
76
 
Equity release mortgages 
Finally, equity release mortgagees are excluded from the regulations.
77
 This departs 
from existing practice in Irish law where such mortgages are treated as ‘housing loans’ 
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 ‘DGI overall loan arrears figures Q1 2016’ (DoE, 2016).  
73
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for the purpose of the Consumer Credit Act 1995.
78
 Indeed, the exclusion is difficult to 
justify given the characteristics of this borrowing arrangement. As discussed in part 1 
of this answer, in the past such mortgages were often conditional upon the borrower 
making a will and disclosing whole sensitive information about beneficiaries etc. 
Furthermore, many borrowers in this market have tended to be elderly persons, some 
of whom may be in need of the finances but also may be vulnerable.  
2) Prior to the implementation of the Directive, did your system have similar rules to 
those laid down in art. 7 regarding the remuneration of the staff working for credit 
institutions, intermediaries or representatives?  
In particular, were there restrictions to tying remuneration to the number of credits 
granted? Do you think the rules on knowledge and skills required of the staff 
significantly alter the existing norms and/or practice? 
A specific range of measures concerning the remuneration of staff working for credit 
institutions, intermediaries or representatives are set out in the Consumer Protection 
Code 2012 (CPC). Prior to the implementation of the MCD, the CPC contained rules 
which were similar rules to those laid down in art. 7 regarding the remuneration of the 
staff working for credit institutions, intermediaries or representatives.  
Conflicts of interest 
The CPC requires regulated entities to maintain an appropriate conflicts of interest 
policy.
79
 This policy must identify the circumstances which constitute or may give rise 
to a conflict of interest entailing a risk of damage of interest to consumers and it must 
specify procedures and measures to manage such conflicts.
80
 Where a conflict of 
interest cannot be reasonably avoided then the regulated entity must disclose the 
general nature and source of the conflicts of interest to the consumer. In a situation of 
conflict, business can only be undertaken with the consumer where the consumer 
acknowledges in writing that he is aware of the conflict and wants to proceed.
81
 
Throughout the regulated entity must ensure that the conflict does not result in 
damage to the interests of the consumer.
82
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 Consumer Credit Act 1995, s.2(c) ‘an agreement for the provision of credit to a person on the security 
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Remuneration   
Under the CPC a mortgage intermediary must disclose in writing to the consumer r the 
existence, nature and amount of any fee, commission or other remuneration received 
or to be received from a product producer in relation to that product or service. Where 
the amount cannot be ascertained, the method of calculating that amount must be 
disclosed. The disclosure must be in a manner that is comprehensive, accurate and 
understandable.
83
  
With respect to remuneration, the CPC requires that where a product producer 
distributes its products to consumers through an intermediary and pays commission to 
an intermediary based on levels of business introduced, the product producer must be 
able to demonstrate that these arrangements do not impair the intermediary’s duty to 
act in the best interests of consumers and do not give rise to a conflict of interest 
between the intermediary and the consumer.
84
 
In addition, regulated entities must ensure that its remuneration arrangements with 
employees in respect of providing, arranging or recommending a product or service to 
a consumer, are not structured in such a way as to have the potential to impair the 
regulated entity’s obligations to act in the best interests of consumers and to satisfy 
the suitability requirements set out in Chapter 5.
85
 Furthermore, regulated entities are 
required to take reasonable steps to ensure that it or any of its officers or employees 
does not offer, give, solicit or accept any gifts or rewards (monetary or otherwise) 
likely to conflict with any duties of the recipient in relation to his or her activities in the 
regulated entity, or the regulated entity.
86
 
Suitability  
Under chapter 5, the regulated entity must recommend, arrange or provide a product 
or service which is appropriate to that consumer’s needs and circumstances.
87
 
Additional requirements apply when a regulated entity is providing a mortgage to a 
consumer.
88
 Lenders are required to carry out an assessment of affordability to 
ascertain the personal consumer’s likely ability to repay the debt, over the duration of 
the agreement.
89
 This must be taken into account when making a decision on whether 
a consumer is likely to be able to repay the debt.
90
 In addition, lenders are required to 
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assess the suitability of a product for a consumer on the basis of the consumers 
personal needs and circumstances.
91
 
Remuneration arrangements in practice  
A 2014 themed inspection carried out by the Central Bank into ‘Sales Incentives to 
Direct Employees of Insurance Companies, Credit Institutions and Investment Firms 
(the ‘Sales Incentives Review’) found that firms failed to recognise inherent risks in 
remuneration arrangements to take appropriate steps to mitigate such risks. In 
particular, the report found that each remuneration scheme reviewed had a 
substantial focus on the achievement of sales volumes or revenues in order to 
determine variable remuneration.
 92
 The inspection found that such schemes carried 
the potential to encourage poor sales behaviours in sales staff, as quality measures 
were not formally linked to unlocking incentives in any meaningful capacity.
93
 
In general remuneration arrangements placed a greater emphasis on rewarding higher 
amounts of sales than achieving suitable consumer outcomes. This was also the case 
with respect to bonus payments which were largely paid on the achievement of sales 
volumes and targets and little regard emphasis was placed on the quality of sales to 
the consumer. The inspection also found significant problems of monitoring and 
enforcement. For instance there was limited use of penalties or deterrents against 
poor sales practices while regular and robust sales quality monitoring not performed 
consistently.
 94  
As a result of the poor results of the themed inspection, the Central Bank have issued 
Guidelines on variable remuneration arrangements for sales staff.
95
 
In the light of your system, do you think more stringent provisions should rule the 
use of expressions such as “advice” and “advisory services” (art. 22)? In other words, 
has the fact that consumers trusted the employees of their local bank branch or 
other credit institution had a significant role in inadequate borrowing or over-
indebtedness? 
In their submission on the MCD consultation FLAC drew attention to the lack of 
objectivity of creditor staff, intermediaries or appointed representatives when it 
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 CPC 2012, arts 5.16-5.18. 
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comes to selling credit and the need to develop an independent and objective service 
that consumers could access for independent advice on these issues.
96
 
3) Regarding pre-contractual information, what changes does the Directive entail in: 
a) advertising (art.11); general information (art. 13) and ESIS (art. 14 and Annex II)?  
Does your country fall within the scope of art. 14.5 (where there was already in place 
a similar form to ESIS, containing “equivalent information requirements”)?  
How does ESIS work with your domestic binding offers or similar transparency 
documents? Has your system increased consumer protection by enlarging the 
reflection period or the right of withdrawal or has it set an amount of time since 
receiving the ESIS (or equivalent) before which the consumer cannot enter into a 
binding agreement? Do you think adopting the ESIS decreases consumer protection 
in your legal system? When and how is the draft credit agreement available to 
consumers? 
The European Voluntary Code of Conduct for Pre Contractual information on home 
loans was adopted by the Irish Banking Federation/Irish Mortgage Council in the early 
2000s and has been widely implemented.
97
 The code provided a basic guide on the 
general information which should be provided to the consumer about home loans. In 
particular, the code set out that personalised information should be provided to the 
consumer at a pre-contractual stage in the form of a European Standardised 
Information Sheet and as such the Directive does not represent a significant change in 
this area.  
4. Does the Directive bring about significant changes with regard to tying and 
bundling practices (art. 12)? 
The MCD does not bring about significant changes with regard to tying and bundling 
practices.
98
 In the first place, under the Consumer Credit Act 1995 a mortgage lender is 
required to arrange through an insurer/insurer intermediary a life assurance policy 
providing, in the event of the death of a borrower before a housing loan made by the 
mortgage lender has been repaid, for payment of a sum equal to the amount of the 
principal outstanding.
99
  
Secondly, the Act also makes clear that tying arrangements are not permitted in Irish 
law. The offer of a mortgage cannot be made conditional on the consumer taking on 
any financial services, conveyancing services, auctioneering services or other services 
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relating to land which that person may require, whether or not in connection with the 
loan.
100
 Where more than one service is made available to the consumer during a 
mortgage transaction each service, as well as any payment due, must be clearly 
distinguished.
101
 FLAC have indicated that while s. 126 requires lenders to arrange a 
policy is provided, there is no obligation to ensure the policy is maintained. During the 
economic and financial crisis a number of policies lapsed due to inability to pay leading 
to greater risk for consumers.
102
 
Under the Consumer Protection Code 2012, tying, bundling and contingent selling is 
generally prohibited.
103
 As set out in the MCD, a feeder account is permitted provided 
the consumer is not obliged to use the account for purposes other than repayments, 
charges cannot be applied for using the account, where additional facilities are 
available they must be optional and all conditions must be communicated to the 
consumer.
104
 
In Ireland, bundling is only permitted where it can be shown that there is a cost saving 
for the consumer.
105
 However, prior to making a bundling product available a creditor 
must provide the consumer with information in writing including the overall cost, the 
separate costs, how to switch products how to exit the bundle etc.
106
 Where payment 
protection insurance is offered in conjunction with a loan the creditor must exclude 
the payment protection premium from the initial repayment estimate of the loan and 
advise the consumer of the amount due separately and use separate application 
forms.
107
 
5. What changes does art. 17 entail with regard to the APRC? Is your system familiar 
with arrangements such as those referred to in art. 17, paragraphs 5 and 6? 
Art 17
108
 does not entail a major change in respect of the calculation of the total cost 
of the mortgage i.e. the APRC or APR. Similar criteria for calculation of APR in relation 
to housing loans is already know in Ireland and is set out in the Consumer Credit Act 
1995. In particular, the Irish system already contains similar arrangements to those set 
out in 17(5) and (6) and so they do not represent a major departure from existing Irish 
law. 
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Under this framework, as in the MCD, certain charges are exempt from the calculation 
of the total cost of credit to the borrower.
109
 These include charges other than the 
purchase price such as Government duties, taxes, agency and legal fees associated 
with the acquisition of the property.
110
 Also exempt are charges payable by the 
borrower for non-compliance with any of his commitments, as well as insurance 
charges – both on the life of the borrower and insurance against damage to the 
property.
111
 
Similar to art. 17, the CCA provides that, when calculating the APR in relation to a 
housing loan, a number of assumption are made. First that the creditor and borrower 
fulfil their obligations under the terms of the contract.
112
 Second, in respect of variable 
rate mortgages where future variations are unquantifiable at the time of calculation, 
the APR is calculated on the assumption that the current rates will remain fixed and 
apply until the end of the term. In the case of a fixed rate mortgage, the calculation is 
on the basis that the fixed rate shall apply only for set periods and any other rates 
applicable at a later date are the current variable rates.
113
 It is also assumed that the 
borrower is not entitled to any income tax relief or any other benefit not granted by 
the creditor under, or relating to, the transaction.
114
 Where any charges are payable at 
an unspecified date after the agreement is signed it is assumed that these are payable 
at the beginning of the agreement.
115
 Finally similar provisions to those set out in 
Annex 1 of the MCD, are set out in the Fourth Schedule of the CCA 1995.
116
  
6. The creditworthiness assessment needs to yield a positive result. Otherwise, the 
credit cannot be granted (art. 18).  Has this been transposed by means of prudential 
norms or by civil law norms, or both? What are the consequences of infringing this 
rule in your legal system (i.e. what happens if the credit has been made available in 
spite of a negative creditworthiness assessment)? And what are the consequences 
for the creditor if the consumer provides false or incomplete information? 
Arts. 18.4 and 20.3 suggest that the creditor’s negligence in carrying out the 
assessment or in demanding the relevant information leads to the credit being 
maintained, which would probably entail that, even if domestic law attaches nullity 
to the infringement of imperative rules, in this case the Directive considers that 
maintaining the validity of the credit in the consumer’s best interests. Nullity is 
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certainly a bad solution for the consumer, but it remains to be seen if being tied to a 
loan he probably cannot afford is a good result. This difficult question is not solved 
by the Directive, which seems to only offer a solution through sanctions and public 
disclosure thereof (art. 38). 
The creditworthiness assessment provisions of the MCD to a large extent reflect 
existing Irish law however they also go beyond existing Irish law.
117
 Under the 
Consumer Protection Code 2012, the lender is required to assess whether the credit 
product is suitable
118
 for the borrower given his needs and in particular whether the 
borrower is able to afford the credit product given his circumstances. 
In the first place, a lender must gather and maintain relevant information about the 
consumers’ needs and circumstances both before and after a mortgage is extended.
119
 
This information is used to assess the consumer’s ability to repay the debt, over the 
term of the agreement.
120
 As part of the affordability assessment the lender to 
required to assess the consumers’ circumstances including age, health, knowledge and 
experience of financial products, dependents, employment status, future changes. The 
lender must also consider, where relevant, the consumer’s financial situation i.e. the 
consumer’s income, savings, financial products, assets and other debts/commitments, 
as well as the consumer’s attitude to risk.
121
 Lenders are required to carry out a test on 
the consumer’s ability to repay the instalments over the duration of the agreement in 
light of a change in circumstances. Under this test a 2% interest rate increase, at a 
minimum, above the interest rate offered to the personal consumer is applied.
122
  
A lender is required to take account of the result of the affordability assessment when 
deciding whether a personal consumer is likely to be able to repay the debt for that 
amount and duration in the manner required under the credit agreement.
123
 However, 
as Kenna and Lynch-Shally point out ‘a negative assessment of affordability under the 
CPC does not amount to a prohibition on the provision of credit’.
124
 
Art. 18(5), as transposed by reg. 19(5) appears to introduce a significant change in Irish 
law in that a lender can only make credit available where the affordability assessment 
produces a positive result. In addition, art 18(3), as transposed by reg. 19(4), also 
introduces a significant change into Irish law by specifically requiring the affordability 
assessment not be predicated on property value or an assumed increase in value.   
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Where a lender contravenes a provision under reg. 19, that lender commits an 
offence.
125
 While the Central Bank can issue sanctions, there is a gap of enforcement in 
respect of this provision.  
It is unclear what the consequences for the creditor are if the consumer provides false 
or incomplete information under art 18. Under Regulation 30(12) the consumer may 
be prosecuted for committing an offence. In such cases it could be anticipated that 
lenders would resort to general contract principles such as misrepresentation.  
In spite of art. 18.3, art. 19 grants property valuation an important role in the context 
of the creditworthiness assessment. Does your legal system allow internal appraisal 
of property, i.e. that the creditor carries out the valuation, albeit under certain 
conditions? 
In Ireland property appraisals are carried out by professional valuers who are usually 
commissioned by the creditor however the consumer may commission a valuer to 
assess the property. The Consumer Credit Act 1995 limits the ability of lenders to levy 
charges arising from valuation reports and legal costs associated with the investigation 
of title.
126
 Under the Consumer Protection Code 2012, a creditor must ensure that it 
had sight of an original valuation report for the property which will act as security for 
the mortgage, prior to providing a mortgage.
127
 
The valuation figure arrived at is used to by the creditor to decide the worthiness of 
the risk involved in the proposed credit transaction. In Ireland the industry is self-
regulated with most valuers represented by the Institute of Professional Auctioneers 
and Valuers (IPAV) which has adopted the European Valuation Standards (EVS) of the 
Blue Book. The IPAV have been members of The European Group of Valuers 
Association since 2014 and have adopted similar professional qualification, standards 
and training policies. This brings the sector into line with Regulation 20(1) which 
required the use of reliable standards such as those developed by the European Group 
of Valuers Association.
128
  
7. The number of consumers trapped by foreign currency loans varies throughout the 
EU. However, it is probably fair to say that most consumers did not understand the 
product they were acquiring, hence why transparency and financial education are 
essential in this area. The Directive demands that there is in place an exchange rate 
limitation arrangement or that the consumer has the opportunity to convert to a 
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more familiar currency (art. 23). Does complying with these requisites solve the 
problems experienced by consumers in your country? 
Foreign currency loans are an important issue in Ireland and this particular aspect of 
the MCD has proved controversial and provoked complaint.
129
 The Republic of Ireland 
shares an open land border with the United Kingdom. While nationals of both the 
Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom are able to live in one state but work in 
the other, the frequency of this cross border activity is particularly associated with 
Northern Ireland. It is common for nationals of the Republic of Ireland to live in the 
Republic but work and earn income in the North and vice versa. In such cases, 
households working in Northern Ireland are paid in sterling but may well take out a 
mortgage in the Republic of Ireland, where they live, in euros.  
In transposing art. 23, the Irish regulations require that the creditor must ensure that 
the consumer has a right, if conditions specified by the creditor are met, to convert the 
credit arrangement into an alternative currency.
130
 Alternatively, the creditor must 
ensure that other arrangements are in place to limit the exchange rate risk to which 
the consumer is exposed under the credit agreement.
131
 Under the regulations the 
alternative currency includes either the currency in which the consumer receives 
income or holds assets or the currency of the EEA Member State in which the 
consumer is resident.
132
 These measures led to concerns that Irish nationals living and 
working in Northern Ireland in a cross border arrangement would be restricted from 
accessing ‘foreign currency loans’. In particular the concern was raised that the 
increased administrative costs associated with offering such loans would dissuade Irish 
banks from extending such credits. This prompted the Central Bank to clarify that 
banks remain free to consider applications for a foreign currency mortgage.
133
  
8. In your view, is art. 24 allowing variable interest rates dependant on indexes set 
by a small group of creditors (borrowing rate among them) or would this not be an 
“objective index”? Has this kind of index caused problems in your country? Do the 
provisions in art. 27 improve consumer protection in your country?  
As discussed in part I, the majority of Irish mortgages are variable rate loans. Broadly 
speaking there are two types of variable rate loans – those that track the ECB base rate 
at an agreed margin (trackers) and those that do not.
134
 Of these two types, tracker 
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mortgages are most common however they were withdrawn from the market in 2009 
following the onset of the economic recession and are no longer available to new 
consumers. This means that the latter type are now the default option for new 
consumers in Ireland. While there are various versions of non-tracker mortgages, in 
general lenders who offer non-tracker mortgages offer no specific link to an underlying 
market or wholesale rate and can choose to increase or decrease the rate at its 
discretion.
135
  
A study commissioned by the Central Bank of Ireland found that in the years preceding 
the economic and financial crisis variable rates followed tracker rates very closely. This 
was largely because variable rate pricing was largely based off the ECB refinancing 
rate.
136
 However, in the years following the crisis variable rates available on the Irish 
mortgage market have diverged substantially from tracker rates and from one another. 
The Central Bank study suggests a number of reasons for this divergence including the 
costs related to increased credit risk. For instance, the study found that Banks with 
higher arrears rates tended to exhibit higher variable mortgage rates. Another reason 
for the increased divergence has been the need for lenders to recoup the losses they 
are making on their tracker loans. In order to do so, some lenders are charging higher 
variables rates which may well result in greater pressure on mortgage arrears.
137
  
Rather than breaking new ground, art. 27
138
, reinforces existing consumer protection 
in Ireland. Under the Consumer Credit Act 1995, a mortgage lender is under a duty to 
supply documents and information concerning the mortgage to the borrower at 
regular intervals (at least yearly).
139
 Where the interest rate is variable the lender is 
under additional disclosure and warning requirements.
140
 Additional requirements for 
mortgage lenders are set out in the Consumer Protection Code 2012. These include 
general disclosure requirements such as the requirement to publish online and keep 
updated interest rates for mortgages which are currently available to consumers from 
the lender.
141
 Any offer of a variable rate mortgage made to a consumer must make 
clear the possibility that interest rates may change and must explain the circumstances 
which would bring it about.
142
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Where a consumer holds a variable rate mortgage and creditor intends to increase the 
rate then specific disclosure requirements apply. In particular, the lender must notify 
the affected consumer in writing of any change in the interest rate on a loan and this 
must include  
a) the date from which the new rate applies;  
b) details of the old and new rate;  
c) the revised repayment amount; and  
d) an invitation for the personal consumer to contact the lender if he or she 
anticipates difficulties meeting the higher repayments.
143
 
Any notification must be provided at least 30 days in advance of any change in the 
interest rate except in the case of a tracker mortgage where notification should be 
provided within 10 business days.
144
 
9. Do provisions on early repayment laid down by art. 25 of the Directive improve 
consumer protection in your legal system? 
Rather than breaking new ground in Irish law, art. 25
145
 on early repayment 
supplements existing rules. Under the Consumer Credit Act 1995, a mortgage lender is 
not entitled to charge any sum/redemption fee
146
 for future interest when a consumer 
elects to end a variable rate mortgage early.
 147
  However, a redemption fee may be 
applicable where a consumer elects to end a fixed rate mortgage early.
148
 The Act does 
not set out how such an early redemption fee is to be calculated. It is in this respect 
that art. 25(3) provides some clarification. However, FLAC have expressed concern that 
tying ‘fair and objective compensation’ for early repayment to possible costs is not 
sufficiently precise and instead have recommended that compensation should be for 
actual loss, objectively demonstrated. FLAC have also recommended that 
compensation should be limited by time and/or level as under the credit agreements 
for consumer’s directive at Article 16, transposed by Regulation 19 of the European 
Communities (Consumer Credit Agreements) Regulations (SI 281/2010).
149
 Neither of 
these sensible recommendations have been endorsed during transposition.  
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10. Are there any practices or rules in your country that may interfere with the right 
to enforce recognised to the creditor by art. 26?  
In the light of your mortgage/security system, how relevant is the provision laid down 
by art. 26.2 (i.e. if applicable, when is the price for auction or sale set)? 
Enforcing the security is the fundamental right of the creditor in Irish mortgage law. In 
practical terms enforcing the security involves the creditor taking possession and then 
bring about a sale of the property. In all cases, except where the property is 
abandoned
150
, a creditor cannot take possession or exercise a sale without first being 
granted a court order or by gaining the consent in writing from the consumer seven 
days before taking possession/exercising a sale.
151
 Once a creditor takes possession he 
must take reasonable time to exercise the power to sell the property, or if not 
appropriate, to lease the property and use the proceeds to reduce the mortgage 
debt.
152
  
The power of sale will arise where the consumer defaults on the mortgage debt for a 
specified period
153
 or breaches some other term of the mortgage.
154
 In all cases at 
least 28 days’ notice must have been served on the consumer by the creditor. When 
exercising a power of sale, the creditor is under a duty to act in good faith
155
 and to 
ensure as far as is reasonably practicable that the property is sold at the best price 
reasonably obtainable i.e. a fair market price.
156
 
In Ireland ‘housing loan mortgages’ are treated separately from other mortgages.
157
 
The term "housing loan" includes all credit agreements secured by a mortgage over 
the principal residence of the borrower or his or her dependants and, any credit 
granted to a consumer which is secured by a mortgage over land on which there is or 
will be a residence.
158
 In terms of determining whether a mortgage over a dwelling is a 
housing loan, the Court have focused on residence and broadly take a substance over 
form approach.
159
 In the case of a housing loan mortgage, there are different 
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procedures for obtaining possession and or an order of sale.
160
 Lenders are also under 
additional standards in such cases. These comprise voluntary codes of conduct, as well 
as codes of conduct issued by the Central Bank which are statutory but seemingly 
limited legal effect.
161
 
Banking & Payments Federation Ireland and the Money Advice & Budgeting Service 
introduced an operational protocol on how to approach debt problems.
162
 However, as 
a self regulatory instrument the protocol is not particularly robust and a creditor may 
avoid the protocol where it deems it appropriate.
163
  The Banking & Payments 
Federation Ireland introduced a Statement of Intent that provided a customer engaged 
with the lender at the earliest opportunity during a default or potential default a 
creditor would not initiate any form of legal action.  
Most importantly, in 2009 the Central Bank introduced the Code of Conduct on 
Mortgage Arrears, since revised, which applies to all mortgage lenders.
164
 This Code 
sets out the framework that lenders must use when dealing with borrowers in 
mortgage arrears or in pre-arrears. Central to the operation of the code is the concept 
of a co-operating consumer. Where a consumer is cooperating with the lender then a 
moratorium applies which prevent lenders from bringing possession proceedings until 
a certain period of time has elapsed.
165
 Under the CCMA 2013, once the consumer is 
deemed to be not co-operative and has received notification by letter then legal 
proceedings may commence three months after the notification by letter or within 
eight months of the default whichever is later.
166
 Where a lender has failed to 
demonstrate compliance with moratorium provisions of the code the Courts will reject 
applications for possession.
167
 However, the Court have indicated that breach of any 
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other provision of the code will not affect a lender’s entitlement to an order for 
possession.
168
  
11. What measures have been adopted to encourage creditors to exercise 
reasonable forbearance before foreclosure (art. 28)? Are they effective? Did your 
system prevent transfer of property in lieu of payment prior to the Directive? If a 
deficiency judgment may be sought after foreclosure, have any measures been 
adopted to ensure that the best efforts price of the property is obtained? If these 
measures had been adopted before the transposition of the Directive and regardless 
of it, you may wish to deal with them below in Part III. 
The measures concerning reasonable forbearance before foreclosure are discussed in 
the previous answer.  
12. Do the provisions regarding charges upon default (art. 28) lead to modifications 
in your system?  
The provisions regarding charges upon default (art. 28) do not lead to major 
modifications of the Irish system. Instead, the situation appears to be broadly in line 
with art. 28 of the MCD which operates to reinforce existing protections. In Ireland, 
under certain circumstances, creditors are allowed to apply charges upon default in 
respect of a housing loan. Under rule 9 of the CCMA 2013 lenders are restricted from 
imposing charges and/or surcharge interest on arrears arising on a mortgage account 
in arrears to which this Code applies and in respect of which a borrower is co-
operating reasonably and honestly with the lender in the Mortgage Arrears Resolution 
Process.
169
 In all cases, information on any charges in respect of arrears on housing 
loans, and how those charges are to be calculated, must be disclosed from the outset 
of the mortgage transaction.
170
 
Part III. Relevant issues that Directive 2014/17 does not solve 
As clearly stated in art. 2, the Directive only introduces maximum harmonisation 
with regard to the ESIS and the APRC. It consciously allows higher levels of consumer 
protection in other areas and it does not address problems such as those 
surrounding foreclosure and the result thereof; art. 28 is especially vague and 
uncompromising. The same can be said with regard to ADR mechanisms, which 
appear to be designed to “channel complaints”, rather than to temper the effects of 
bad practices arising at the time of foreclosure (art. 39).On the other hand, the 
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Directive implicitly allows arrangements that have proven to be dangerous for 
consumers in some systems, and could be fatal if they were to be exported to others 
(for instance, if interest only mortgages were to be generally offered to consumers in 
Spain). Last, but not least, it does not interfere with internal substantive and 
procedural domestic provisions on securities over immovables. In this block it would 
be excellent if you could detect whether any of the problems you highlighted in Part 
I arise in these areas that the Directive does not cover and, if so, whether your 
legislature or government has taken any measures to alleviate the effects on 
consumers. If any such measure has been adopted, please provide a general sketch 
thereof. 
Locating the MCD in Irish mortgage law 
Irresponsible lending practices played a major role in the development of the housing 
bubble.
171
 The impact of the MCD on such practices appears mixed. On one hand, the 
MCD provides a clear framework with respect to assessing the creditworthiness of 
consumers before deciding to extend mortgage credit. To a large extent the MCD 
reflects the provisions of the Consumer Protection Code, however the MCD does go 
farther in several important respects. Unlike the Consumer Protection Code, the MCD 
expressly requires that the affordability assessment must produce a positive result in 
order for the mortgage to be made available. Furthermore, the MCD makes clear that 
this assessment cannot be premised on the assumption that property prices will rise 
for the foreseeable future.  
On the other hand, the MCD is relatively silent on the concept of responsible lending 
and does not set guidelines on loan to value and loan to income ratios. This was a 
particular problem in Ireland during the boom when mortgages lost touch with 
deposits and incomes. Mortgage lending at high multiples of income was one of the 
main causes of increases in property prices during the early 2000s and was a significant 
reason for the sharp contraction in the downturn.
172
 Studies commissioned by the 
Central Bank have shown a positive relationship between higher loan-to-value and 
loan-to-income ratios and subsequent mortgage defaults.
173
 In spite of the MCD 
reticence on the issue, the Central Bank introduced a range of macro prudential 
measures in 2015 aimed at restricting risky lending and dampening property price 
speculation. In particular, limits have been set on loan to value and loan to income 
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ratios.
174
 With respect to specific mortgage products, the MCD is largely silent. In 
Ireland interest only mortgages have been a source of considerable concern. While 
such mortgages were largely withdrawn in 2009, it remains possible for creditors to 
issue mortgages in the future and the MCD does not alter that situation.  
The MCD does not address the problems surrounding arrears and foreclosure and this 
is remarkable in an Irish context where mortgage arrears has become a major policy 
focus.
175
 As set out above various codes of conduct on mortgage arrears have been 
introduced which require lenders to forestall taking legal action where a consumer is 
engaging with the lender. This is in spite of extensive research which has outlined a 
range of policy measures which could greatly assist in offsetting the social and 
economic fallout of the crisis.
176
 
It is also important to note that transposing the MCD by regulation has indirectly 
reinforced the provisions of the Consumer Protection Code. This may well be 
important in light of the recent Supreme Court decision that demonstrates that codes 
issued by the Central Bank are of limited legal effect.
177
 However, it remains to be seen 
whether this will result in a material improvement in the consumer protection 
framework. In particular, the MCD is silent on effective enforcement mechanisms and 
civil sanctions for non-compliance and the transposing regulation does not go further 
than outlining in broad terms that non-compliance with the regulations is an 
offence.
178
 Criminal proceedings are very rarely brought in the Irish legal system and 
the system of administrative sanctions by the Central Bank lacks transparency. In 
summary, the essential weakness of the consumer protection framework in respect of 
mortgages has not been addressed by the MCD and this greatly undermines the overall 
potential for the MCD to result in a meaningful change. 
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Part IV. Personal conclusions 
During the Bourbon Restoration, following the fall of Napoleon in 1814, the Bourbon 
loyalists and exiles who returned to France attempted to pick up exactly where they 
left off, as though nothing had changed and as though the revolution had never 
happened. According to Talleyrand, or at least a quote often attributed to him, the 
returning exiles ‘had learned nothing and forgotten nothing’.  The collapse of the Irish 
mortgage market was severe by international standards and set in motion a series of 
profound financial, economic and social crisis, which, in spite of the recent return to 
economic growth, continue to impact Ireland today. After almost a decade since the 
onset of the systemic collapse of the mortgage market, this assessment has sought to 
outline, in light of the MCD, what lessons have been learned since the onset of the 
crisis and importantly how much of the old ways have been forgotten.   
While several important lessons have been gleaned from the failures of the regulatory 
framework, longstanding and acute difficulties remain unaddressed. In particular, 
while the Central Bank have adopted a more pro-active stance in respect to regulating 
the mortgage market, the policy changes have been limited to controlling lending in a 
broad brush manner – a policy which the MCD supplements indirectly. However, the 
underlying weakness of the consumer protection framework in terms of civil sanction 
and enforcement has not been addressed and the MCD does not alter this. Thus, while 
there are positive features of the MCD, in reality it does not represent a major sea 
change in Irish mortgage law. Instead, the provisions of the MCD largely reflect and, in 
some cases, supplement existing measures.  
The introduction of loan to value and loan to income ratios reflect the Central Bank’s 
concern at the relatively rapid growth in property prices from trough in 2010 to 2015 – 
during which time property prices in Dublin increased by 50%. Clearly, the potential for 
rapid variations in price has survived the crisis and so it remains to be seen whether 
the underlying forces, which destabilised the Irish housing market during the 2000s, 
have actually been addressed. Indeed, the popular opposition to the Central Bank’s 
new macro prudential policies suggest that old habits die-hard.
179
 This opposition is in 
spite of the fact that the social and economic impacts of the crisis remain acute, 
particularly in relation to mortgage arrears – which the MCD does not effectively 
address. With the mortgage to rent scheme still in its infancy, it remains the case that 
historically low interest rates have assuaged the extent of the mortgage arrears crisis. 
However, the assumption that interest rates will remain at such historically low rates 
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for the foreseeable future, may well prove to be just as unsustainable as the old 
assumption that property prices would continue to rise for the foreseeable future.  
Finally, in the wake of the collapse of the housing bubble, Government housing policy 
resiled from the long-standing State support for home ownership and instead 
espoused the need for tenure neutrality.
180
 Policy makers have long stressed the 
benefits of a secure and affordable private rented sector as a counterpoint to the 
housing market.
181
 However, so far the radical change in language has not been 
accompanied by a similarly radical commitment to tenure neutral housing policies. 
Indeed, many of the State supports for homeownership, such as the local authority 
tenant purchase schemes, remain operational. In summary, it remains to be seen just 
how much of the old practices have been forgotten since the collapse of the mortgage 
market.  
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